Timely Feedback in Unstructured Cybersecurity Exercises by Vykopal, Jan et al.
Timely Feedback in Unstructured Cybersecurity Exercises
Jan Vykopal
Masaryk University, Institute of Computer Science
Brno, Czech Republic
vykopal@ics.muni.cz
Radek Ošlejšek
Masaryk University, Faculty of Informatics
Brno, Czech Republic
oslejsek@fi.muni.cz
Karolína Burská
Masaryk University, Faculty of Informatics
Brno, Czech Republic
burska@mail.muni.cz
Kristína Zákopčanová
Masaryk University, Faculty of Informatics
Brno, Czech Republic
zakopcanova@mail.muni.cz
ABSTRACT
Cyber defence exercises are intensive, hands-on learning events for
teams of professionals who gain or develop their skills to success-
fully prevent and respond to cyber attacks. The exercises mimic
the real-life, routine operation of an organization which is being
attacked by an unknown offender. Teams of learners receive very
limited immediate feedback from the instructors during the exer-
cise; they can usually see only a scoreboard showing the aggregated
gain or loss of points for particular tasks. An in-depth analysis of
learners’ actions requires considerable human effort, which results
in days or weeks of delay. The intensive experience is thus not
followed by proper feedback facilitating actual learning, and this
diminishes the effect of the exercise.
In this initial work, we investigate how to provide valuable feed-
back to learners right after the exercise without any unnecessary
delay. Based on the scoring system of a cyber defence exercise, we
have developed a new feedback tool that presents an interactive,
personalized timeline of exercise events. We deployed this tool
during an international exercise, where we monitored participants’
interactions and gathered their reflections. The results show that
learners did use the new tool and rated it positively. Since this
new feature is not bound to a particular defence exercise, it can be
applied to all exercises that employ scoring based on the evaluation
of individual exercise objectives. As a result, it enables the learner
to immediately reflect on the experience gained.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks threatening ICT infrastructure have become routine.
Their intensity and complexity are growing with the increasing
number of interconnected devices exposed to attackers and the
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influx of new vulnerabilities being revealed each year. Unfortu-
nately, there is a significant global shortage of cybersecurity work-
ers equipped with the skills necessary for preventing or responding
to the attacks [6].
Cyber defence exercises (CDX) [1] represent a popular type of
training that aims to fill this skill gap. They enable participants to
experience cyber attacks first-hand with real-life limitations, includ-
ing a lack of information and resources, the need for communication
and making decisions under stress.
CDX are usually intensive, short-term events lasting several
days. Tens to hundreds of professional learners participate and
are grouped in teams. The target groups are administrators of ICT
systems, incident responders, and security managers. The exer-
cises deliver rich immediate experience of ongoing attacks and the
opportunity to practice crisis procedures and techniques.
In contrast to structured, step-by-step hands-on training guided
by an instructor, teams of learners have to figure out all the issues
on their own, in the order they agree on, within the team. These
settings simulate real operation but prevent any direct feedback
from instructors (exercise organizers). Learners can only presume
what they did was correct, what worked and what did not. The only
feedback they are given during the exercise is often through an
exercise score with no further details about score breakdown. Some
exercise organizers provide technical reports after the exercise,
which reveal some details highlighting important moments from
the perspective of a particular team of learners. The after-action
report is sometimes also complemented by a short workshop, which
provides an opportunity to discuss the content of the exercise with
the instructors in person. Nevertheless, all these methods of feed-
back are delivered with a significant delay after the actual exercise
because they require preparation from the instructors that cannot
begin before the end of the exercise.
In this paper, we study whether learners benefit from simple, but
individualized feedback provided just after the end of a two-day
intensive exercise. In our study, each team was provided with an
interactive timeline of its score development during the exercise,
with important events emphasized. The timeline was generated
automatically from data stored by an existing scoring system. All
interactions of exercise participants (mouse clicks and movements)
were logged with the scoring timeline. After that, participants were
asked to fill out short evaluation questionnaire. The data and an-
swers we obtained show that learners valued the feedback, even
though they still lack more details about particular events.
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2 STATE OF THE ART
Research on providing feedback in complex and unstructured cy-
bersecurity exercises is very scarce. The following overview is
therefore based not only on a review of academic literature but also
on technical reports published by organizers and the experience of
authors who participated in several CDXs.
One of the world’s largest exercise is Locked Shields [8], which
is organized annually by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia. Immediate brief feedback to
learners is provided at a so-called "hot wash-up" session right after
the exercise since any time lag will diminish the learning impact [7].
Educators provide a summary of the exercise’s progression and
comment on key moments that drove it. More comprehensive and
detailed feedback is available only at a workshop which is held a
month later, and furthermore, not all learners come to this event.
Another international exercise organized by NATO is Cyber
Coalition. Very brief feedback is provided a day later in-person at a
hot wash-up session. More specific information is available only in
the form of an after-action report at a workshop, which takes place
a month later [9]. A very similar type of feedback, with an even
longer delay is provided in Cyber Europe, another international
exercise organized by ENISA. [2]
Granåsen and Andersson [4] focused on measuring team effec-
tiveness in CDXs. They thoroughly analysed system logs, observer
reports, and surveys collected during Baltic cyber shield 2010, a
multi-national civil-military CDX. They concluded that these mul-
tiple data sources provided valuable insight into the exercise’s run.
However, they did not mention how to use these data for providing
feedback. The only feedback provided to learners was during a
virtual after-action review the day after the exercise, where only
the leaders of learners’ and organizers’ teams summarized and
discussed their experience.
Henshel et al. [5] also focused on the assessment model and
metrics for team proficiency in CDXs. They analysed learners’ and
observers’ input from surveys and intrusion detection logs from
the Cyber Shield 2015 exercise. Similarly to the Baltic cyber shield
exercise, the feedback provided to learners was not based on an
analysis of acquired data since the analysis was done manually and
required significant human effort.
Since existing CDXs do not provide any timely and personalized
feedback to the learners, we also mention a feedback-related study
in learning, which does not concern CDXs. Gibbs and Taylor [3]
focused on the theory that personalized feedback does not hold
such importance or a value compared to its time-consumption for
the instructor.
3 EXPERIMENT SETUP
In this experiment, we studied the behaviour and interactions of
participants at a complex cyber defence exercise held on May 23–24,
2017 at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic. The exercise
is focused on defending critical information infrastructure (partic-
ularly railway infrastructure administration) against skilled and
coordinated attackers.
First, the learners got access to the exercise infrastructure to
become familiar with virtual hosts in their network. Then, they
took part in an intensive exercise where they faced challenges posed
Table 1: Phases of the exercise with time allocation
Order Phase Duration Day
1 Exercise familirization 3 hrs 1
2 Actual exercise 6 hrs 2
3 Post-exercise survey 5 mins 2
4 Break 25 mins 2
5 Scoring timeline interaction 10 mins 2
6 Scoring timeline survey 5 mins 2
7 Quick exercise debriefing 15 mins 2
by simulated attackers and legitimate users. Right after the end of
the exercise, the learners were asked to express their immediate
impressions about the exercise in a short post-exercise survey. After
a short break, a timeline depicting the score of each team was
presented in the exercise portal. Finally, the learners were asked to
evaluate the timeline via a very short questionnaire. Time allocated
for each phase of the experiment is shown in Table 1.
3.1 Exercise participants
The experiment involved a Red vs. Blue exercise with 40 partici-
pants working in an emulated ICT infrastructure. The structure of
the exercise is inspired by the Locked Shield exercise [8, 10]. The
participants were divided into four groups according to their role
and tasks in the exercise. Their interactions are depicted in Figure 1.
Blue Team Red Team- attack
- scan
- penetrate
- secure
- monitor
- defense
Green Team
- maintain
- repair
- fix
White Team
- rules
- score
- guide
Figure 1: Exercise participants, their interactions and tasks.
Twenty professional learners formed five Blue teams (T1–T5)
which were put into the role of emergency security teams sent into
five organizations to recover compromised networks. Each team of
4 learners was responsible for securing the compromised networks,
dealing with the attacks, collaborating with other emergency teams,
and collaborating with the coordinator of the operation and media
representatives. They had to follow the exercise’s rules and local
cybersecurity law. Each team represented one real cybersecurity
response team from one country in Central Europe.
All attacks against infrastructure defended by Blue teams were
conducted by Red team. This team consisted of cyber security pro-
fessionals who carefully followed a predefined attack scenario to
equally load the Blue teams. This means they should not use any
other arbitrary means of attack against the Blue teams. Based on the
success of attacks, the Red team assigns penalty points to the Blue
teams since the amount of points is based on non-trivial factors
that need expert review.
Exercise managers, referees, organizers, and instructors worked
in White team. During the exercise, this team assigns tasks (called
injects) to the Blue teams and thus simulates the requests of many
entities, such as legitimate users of the defended organization, the
operation coordinator which needs situational reports, media in-
quiries, and law enforcement agencies. Then the White team as-
sesses the promptness and quality of a Blue teams’s reactions to
these tasks and assigns penalties and points.
Finally, the Green team is a group of operators and system ad-
ministrators responsible for the exercise infrastructure. They have
full access to the exercise network so they can provide assistance
to Blue teams in trouble in an exchange for penalty points.
3.2 Exercise phases
Before the actual exercise (Phase 1 in Table 1), learners are provided
with a background story to introduce them to the situation before
they enter the compromised networks. Then they access their part
of the emulated network for 3 hours to get familiar with the exercise
infrastructure. This is very important since the exercise is not set
in a known environment and learners have no previous knowledge
about who is who in the fictitious scenario (e. g., users in their
organization, a popular news portal, superordinate security team).
The exercise (Phase 2) is driven by a detailed scenario which
includes the actions of attackers (Red team) and assignments for
the defenders prepared by the organizers (White team). Attackers
exploit specific vulnerabilities left in the compromised network in
a fixed order. This follows a common attack life cycle in a critical
information infrastructure. On top of that, learners should also
answer media inquires and requests from users doing their routine
job in the defended network. The performance of each Blue team
is scored based on successful attacks or their mitigation, the avail-
ability of specified critical services and the quality of reporting and
communication. The score is either computed automatically from
events, processed by the logging infrastructure (e. g., a penalty for
inaccessible services) or entered manually (e. g., attacks completed
by the Red team). An aggregated score is shown to participants in
real-time. Table 2 shows the structure of the scoreboard and the
values of aggregated score.
Table 2: The scoreboard presented to the learners during the
exercise.
Team Services Attacks Injects Users Access Total
T1 91,843 -8,500 9,000 -1,100 0 91,243
T5 92,230 -5,000 3,600 -400 0 90,430
T2 81,280 -10,750 6,425 -4,000 0 72,955
T4 74,518 -11,000 6,650 0 -4,000 66,168
T3 85,756 -12,000 2,475 -1,700 -9,500 65,031
Note: Teams are sorted according to their final score.
”Injects” is an abbreviation for communication injects of the White team.
Immediately after the end of the exercise, we asked the learners
to evaluate the exercise and their experience by rating several
statements using the Likert scale (Phase 3).
3.3 Scoring timeline application
After a break (Phase 4), the score acquired by each team during
the exercise was presented to the Blue teams in the form of an
interactive application, as shown in Figure 2 (Phase 5). It provided
automatically generated personalized feedback. Members of each
team could only see their own scoring timeline with individual
exercise events.
The initial score of each team is 100 000 points. In the graph, the
main, predominantly descending line represents the development of
a team’s total score over time. The score is computed from penalties
and awarded points that were either recorded automatically for the
inaccessibility of required network services or assignedmanually by
the Red or White team. The colourful dots are interactive and they
are related just to the manual rating. The red dots represent Red
team penalties, white dots represent the rating of communication
injects by the White team, yellow dots indicate the rating of user
simulated injects by theWhite team, and grey dots indicate requests
for assistance from the Green team (to grant temporary remote
access to a machine or revert to the initial state). Each dot contains
textual information that specifies the reason for the rating. This
information is shown in each dot’s tooltip.
Learners were able to provide us with their reflection on their
penalty and awarded points very easily by clicking on the coloured
dots and choosing one of predefined options (Phase 5; see right-
hand side of Figure 2), e. g., whether they recognized the attack
or not, or why they did not respond to the inject of the White
team. Moreover, all scoring timeline interactions, including mouse
clicks, mouse movements, and selected options were logged. This
data, together with answers from a short survey on the scoring
timeline (Phase 6) were used to evaluate the usefulness of the timely
feedback.
Finally, representatives of the Red and White team provided a
short debrief of the exercise (”hot wash-up”, Phase 7) from their
perspective. They highlighted important breaking points of exercise
and pointed out exemplary or interesting decisions and actions took
by Blue teams. This part is mentioned here only for completeness,
no input from learners was required for the experiment.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Post-exercise survey
The post-exercise survey was focused on general qualitative as-
pects of the exercise. Relevant statements to this study are listed in
Table 3 and marked as E1–E4 for further reference. The statistical
distribution of individual answers across all teams is depicted in
Figure 3.
We collected answers from all 20 participants. However, four of
them did not provide their identification and so their answers were
omitted from the team statistics. Team values were computed as
the average from a five-point Likert scale answers (1 = strongly
disagree, 5 = completely agree). The Average column represents the
average value across all answers regardless of teams.
Figure 2: A screenshot of a scoring timeline providing personalized feedback for each team right after the exercise.
Table 3: Team statistics for the post-exercise and scoring timeline surveys
Statement Team 2 Team 1 Team 5 Team 4 Team 3 Average
E1: My knowledge and skills were sufficient. 3.75 3 2.6 2.5 2 3.05
E2: I found exercise difficult for me. 3.33 3 4 4.25 5 3.8
E3: Exercise was well organized and structured. 2.66 3.25 3.3 4 5 3.75
E4: Exercise was beneficial and useful to me. 2.66 3.5 4 4.5 5 3.85
F1: The scoring timeline of my team displayed after the end
of the exercise provided useful feedback.
3.25 2.5 - 4.25 3.66 3.53
F2: Do you have any comments on the scoring timeline? D M - M M
1 = strongly disagree, 5 = completely agree, D = there was a delay in inserting points by a Red and White team, M = add more details about the depicted events
1 2 3 4 5
F1
E4
E3
E2
E1
Figure 3: Distribution of all answers to E1 – E4 and F1.
The aim of E1 and E2 was to reveal the level of expertise of indi-
vidual teams and the difficulty of the exercise. Individual answers
to E1 significantly varied, which indicates that learners had signifi-
cantly different expertise. However, the average values calculated
for each team reveal that the exercise was well balanced with no
extremely weak or strong team. The answers to E2 indicate that
the overall difficulty of the exercise was considered as rather high.
Two statements in the questionnaire, E3 and E4, were focused
on satisfaction with the organizational aspects and usefulness of
the exercise. Both statements brought very similar answers. Teams
that were more satisfied with the organization also considered the
exercise more beneficial. Even though the opinion differed across
the teams, learners considered the exercise rather beneficial and
well organized in general.
4.2 Scoring timeline interaction
Figure 4: An example of a heatmap of mouse movements
and clicks on a screen of a scoring timeline.
In order to evaluate the scoring timeline, we were actively record-
ing learners’ interactions with a tool. We obtained data from 18
learners, 2 learners were missing due to technical issues. The data
consisted of 2,994 individual low-level events (mouse clicks, mouse
hovers, etc.). Moreover, we recorded heatmaps of mouse positions
on the screen (see an example in Figure 4). Putting this data to-
gether, we were able to estimate the focus of the learners during
their exploration of the scoring timeline. A deeper analysis did not
reveal any preference patterns in the sense that learners would
be more interested in some kind of objectives, such as Red team
attacks, White team injects, or penalties from later critical phases
of the exercise. On the contrary, it seems that the learners were
interested in all the penalties and awards roughly the same.
Analyses of timestamps revealed that the time spent by individ-
ual learners with the scoring timeline ranged between 1m 22s and
8m 27s It is worth noting that there was no significant difference
between teams. They spent approximately 3 to 5 minutes with the
feedback application on average. We also did not find any relation
between the time spent with the timeline and the willingness to
provide their reflection on particular penalties or awards. Many
learners just spent a long time with only a passive exploration of
the timeline.
Seven learners from four teams also gave us an active reflection
to penalties in addition to passively exploring the scoring timeline.
The values in Table 4 represent the numbers of collected answers
per team and objective type. Blue team 1 is omitted from the table
because we got no data from them. These results are discussed in
Section 5.
Table 4: Numbers of responses of each team to objectives.
Teams
Objectives T2 T3 T4 T5
∑
Red team attacks 7 13 5 1 26
Users injects 5 7 0 1 13
Communication injects 0 5 0 2 7
Green team assistance 0 4 2 0 6
4.3 Scoring timeline survey
The usefulness of the feedback provided via the scoring timeline
was evaluated with a short survey. We got answers from 13 learners
(out of 20) because Blue team 5 did not respond at all. The statements
and their team statistics are shown in Table 3 under the labels F1
and F2.
1 2 3 4 5
Team 3
Team 4
Team 2
Team 1
Figure 5: Distribution of answers to F1. Teams are sorted ac-
cording to the final score (the best on the top).
The data shows that the usefulness of the feedback can be consid-
ered to be "rather useful" (the average value across all the teams is
3.53). A detailed distribution of answers depicted in Figure 5 reveals
that the most successful team considered the feedback less useful
than other teams.
Answers to the open question F2 provided four comments on
possible improvements. Three teams requested more details about
penalties. They would appreciate knowing "how it happened" in
addition to "what happened" (marked as M in Table 3). One com-
ment objected that "some attacks were happening way sooner in
reality than on the timeline" (marked as D in Table 3). This is true
because attack penalties were inserted by the Red team manually
with some delay.
5 DISCUSSION
The validity of the timely feedback evaluation would be affected
by dissatisfaction with the exercise so the learners would not be
interested in the feedback at all or they would provide distorted
data. Dissatisfaction can be caused by poor organization, unfulfilled
expectations, or by a disparity between the difficulty of the exer-
cise and the knowledge of learners. In general, this exercise was
considered slightly difficult and was also assessed positively (see
Section 4.1). Although the exercise was attended by skilled teams
whose members had previous experience with similar exercises,
they still considered it rather difficult, challenging and useful. There-
fore, we believe that conclusions drawn from the analysis based on
this particular exercise and its participants are plausible. In the fol-
lowing part, we put together the results of the post-exercise survey,
the scoring timeline survey, and the exploration of the timeline and
analyse their mutual relationships.
Teams sought out feedback. A deeper analysis of learners’ inter-
actions with the scoring timeline shows that all teams were using it
intensively, regardless of what reflection they provided in the scor-
ing timeline survey. All teams explored all the penalties depicted in
their timeline. They also gave us an evaluation of the majority of
displayed objectives. The only exception was Team 4, probably due
to technical issues. Team 5, which did not respond to the scoring
timeline survey at all, still explored their timeline actively. Team 1
rated the scoring timeline as less useful than other teams. It was the
most successful team according to the final score and, therefore, the
feedback may not have been so interesting for them because they
might have already known about their failures. However, even this
team was interested in the timely feedback because they explored
the scoring timeline for the longest.
A need for more detail. Answers to the open question F2 con-
firmed our assumption that more precise and more detailed infor-
mation provided by the timely feedback makes the feedback even
more attractive to learners. Nevertheless, the need for more detail
can also be indirectly inferred. For example, a further analysis of
the White team’s injects (users and communication injects) indi-
cates that teams often underestimated time-dependant response
to this type of "soft" request. Teams could either consider these
requests "annoying" and not so important in comparison with at-
tacks or they could just be too busy with the attacks, for instance.
A deeper understanding of their behaviour also requires collecting
more detailed and better structured data from the timely feedback.
Benefits for instructors. Although the scoring feedback was in-
tended primarily for learners, the previous discussion shows that it
is very valuable also for organizers and educators who can learn
about the exercise and then fine tune its parameters, e. g., by better
scheduling of the White team’s injects with respect to the attacks.
Since learners are not usually aware of this value, they do not make
more effort than necessary into providing quality and valuable
information for instructors. However, if providing reflections is
intuitive and quick for them, they are motivated to use it. Further-
more, since the feedback is generated automatically, organizers can
get valuable data without any additional effort.
Limitations of the study. This study is limited in two respects.
First, data were obtained from a single exercise with a relatively
small group of participants. The reason is that the organization of
such a complex exercise is expensive and time-consuming and it is
organized rarely for only a narrow group of experts. Nevertheless,
we consider the sample to be representative because the learners
were highly qualified experts, often with experience in similar
exercises and the exercise received a positive rating from them.
Second, the timeline evaluation questionnaire was simple and freely
structured. However, this was intentional since the survey took
place at the end of an exhausting two-day exercise and thus a
more sophisticated questionnaire might not have guaranteed more
precise results.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
To best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to study
the means of providing feedback to learners participating in cyber
defence exercises. The literature review and our own experience
showed that feedback provided in state-of-the-art exercises is very
limited or delayed. The most often used method is an exercise score-
board displayed to the learners throughout the exercise. Another
method is a short verbal evaluation by exercise observers or organiz-
ers right after the end the exercise or its phases. The last commonly
used method is after-action reports highlighting key conclusions
from a laborious manual analysis of heterogeneous data acquired
during the exercise (survey, written communication, scoring and
monitoring logs, and checks).
The lack of timely feedback results in the learners having limited
opportunity to learn from their experience. They undergo numer-
ous real-life situations during the exercise, but they are not sup-
plied with an explanation why such situations occur. We therefore
complemented these means by a novel approach which provides
feedback to learners right after the end of the exercise with no
additional effort required from educators. Learners can explore a
scoring timeline depicting increases and decreases in their team’s
score and display details about individual events (name and type of
the exercise objective, and the number of awarded points or penalty
points). Also, they have an opportunity to provide their reflections
to educators and indicate their awareness about a particular ob-
jective and its solution. The exploration and interaction with the
scoring timeline enables learners to reflect on their experience and
thus strengthen the learning impact of the exercise.
In order to evaluate this approach, we ran an experiment involv-
ing a two-day, complex cyber defence exercise with 24 objectives,
and 20 professional learners from five security teams. The results,
based on an analysis of user surveys and interactions with the new
tool, suggest that learners welcomed the new feature even though
the feedback was mined automatically and thus provided a very
limited level of detail about particular events.
The experiment also outlined directions for future work. First,
learners would appreciate more detail about a particular event in the
timeline. This can be easily done by adding a detailed description of
the objective related to the event. Another option is to extend the
scoring application so that instructors can not only assign points,
but also provide a comment on each exercise objective. Second,
the timeline could be enriched with a display of the relationship
between all exercise objectives. This would highlight that an event
that the team may not have been aware of was caused by several
previous events they encountered. The context can be then built
not only from a time perspective, but also from the topology of the
exercise network. Providing information on which host or service
was affected by the particular event may help learners to recall the
particular situation and understand it better. Finally, the ultimate
goal is to provide a ”replay function”, which would show how at-
tackers proceeded and what could have been done better to prevent
or mitigate attacks.
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